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NOTES
WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CLASH:
THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN
CASES INVOLVING MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
The representation of more than one defendant in a criminal trial
by a single attorney creates dangers that should not be ignored by
the trial judge.' Unfortunately, many judges either ignore or
underestimate the dangers of joint representation before and during
trial and do not conduct hearings or other procedures designed to
determine whether a conflict of interest may exist.' When this
happens, a jointly represented defendant who is ultimately convicted
will often bring a post-conviction writ alleging that because his at-
torney represented another defendant, a conflict of interest deprived
him of his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.'
1. When one attorney or law firm represents two or more defendants in
a single criminal trial, it is commonly referred to as either joint or multiple represen-
tation. The problems involved in multiple representation can occur in both the civil
and criminal context. See, e.g., Judd, Conflicts of Interest, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1097,
1107 (1976) (describing types of conflicts in civil cases). This note deals exclusively
with the problems of joint representation in criminal cases, which are more likely
to endanger constitutional rights because only in a criminal case does a defendant
have the sixth amendment right to counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
see infra note 93. Conflicts of interest can develop from joint representation in civil
cases, and may give rise to ethical questions regarding an attorney's duty to ade-
quately represent the best interests of his clients. However, there is no right to counsel
in civil cases, and thus the problem is not as constitutionally significant as in a criminal
case. See, e.g., Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1980) (stringent standards of
effective assistance of council mandated by the sixth amendment do not apply to civil
proceedings). Joint representation alo applies to attorney's "associated in the prac-
tice of law." See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (pro-
viding that if "a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employ-
ment because of a potential conflict, no partner or associate of his or her firm may
accept or continue such employment."); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION, S 3.5(b) (Approved Draft 1971) (applicable to "a lawyer or lawyers who are
associated in practice.") The term "joint counsel" as used in this note refers to the
single attorney who is representing one of more defendants in a criminal trial.
2. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
3. A defendant cannot make a direct appeal of his conviction based solely
upon alleged conflicts due to joint representation. A defendant cannot directly appeal
because if he fails to object to his joint representation at trial, the court assumes
he has waived his right to separate representation. Whether any conflicts actually
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The dangers of joint representation are so great that some writers
and a few courts advocate the disqualification of joint counsel in every
criminal trial.' This solution would certainly eliminate any conflicts.
However, the disqualification of counsel directly implicates another
constitutional right embodied in the sixth amendment: the right of
a criminal defendant to retain the attorney of his choice, and even
to dispense with an attorney altogether if he so chooses.' In all joint
representation situations, a trial judge must choose between two alter-
natives. He must either allow joint representation to continue or he
must disqualify joint counsel.' Whichever choice he makes will to some
extent endanger one of these two conflicting sixth amendment rights:
the right to effective assistance of counsel versus the right to counsel
of choice.
The trial judge has the difficult task of delicately balancing these
rights. On one side, he must weigh the potential dangers that are
arose due to this joint representation is therefore not a question that an appellate
court can consider. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (contemporaneous objec-
tion rule applies to joint representation cases). Therefore, to obtain post-conviction
relief of this issue, a defendant must normally file a writ of habeas corpus. This writ
is an extraordinary procedure, but one of its primary uses involves the allegation of
ineffective counsel. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 "an application for writ of habeas
corpus ... shall not be granted unless it appears the applicant has exhausted remedies
available in the courts of the state .... Since non-objection to joint representation
is considered an implied waiver of the right to separate representation, appellate
remedies are exhausted and a defendant may file a federal or state habeas claim of
ineffective counsel. On habeas review, a defendant must satisfy the Cuyler standard
in order to obtain relief. See infra text accompanying notes 55-65.
4. See infra note 79.
5. The right to choice of counsel is derived from the 1975 Supreme Court
case, Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a criminal defendant
has the absolute right to represent himself unassisted by counsel. Some commentators
argue that it appears to follow from this right in Farretta that a criminal defendant
has a correlative right to proceed with whatever assistance he chooses, including joint
counsel burdened by conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Hyman, Joint Representation of Multi-
ple Criminal Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV.
315, 320 (1977). Hyman argues that since a defendant has the prerogative to waive
his right to the assistance of counsel, he would appear to have a fortiori the power
to waive his right to the effective assistance of counsel and proceed with joint counsel.
Many Courts agree with this reasoning and thus allow a defendant to be jointly
represented out of respect for his constitutional right to counsel of choice. See United
States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento,
524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (6th
Cir., 1975). However, because of additional concerns that are present when counsel
represents two or more defendants that do not arise when a defendant represents
himself, the above a fortiori argument probably does not apply to the joint represen-
tation context. For a discussion of these additional concerns see infra text accompany-
ing notes 88-92.
6. See infra note 108.
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present in every joint representation case to adequately protect a
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel.7 On the other side, he must
weigh the defendant's interest in presenting his best defense and his
constitutional right to choice of counsel.' The current practice in many
jurisdictions allows the judge to merely assume, absent any objec-
tion, that no conflicts exist.' This view is based on the theory that
any conflicts that do arise are impliedly waived. Due to the dangers
of joint representation and its impact on the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants, this approach cannot continue.
The purposes of this note are (1) to explain the dangers that
lurk in the background of almost every multiple representation case,
(2) to examine the current approaches to these problems, both as ap-
plied by the courts and as suggested by commentators, (3) to explain
why most of these approaches are not working, and (4) to propose
a solution that is both viable under constitutional standards and can
be at the same time realistically applicable to the trial court setting.
The approach suggested, will ideally prevent most conflicts from
arising, while leaving room for a defendant's valid exercise of his right
to counsel of choice.
I. THE DANGER OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST INHERENT IN
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
A. Types of Conflicts
When an attorney represents multiple defendants in a single
criminal case, conflicts of interest develop both in ways that are readily
apparent to the attorney and in ways that are highly unforeseeable
before trial. Perhaps the most foreseeable example of a conflict occurs
where co-defendants offer antagonistic defenses." For instance, a con-
7. See infra text accompanying notes 10-30.
8. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 118.
10. A good example of a case where antagonistic defenses led to a conflict
of interest is United States ex rel Tonaldi v. Elrod, 716 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1983) where
three defendants were charged with possession of cocaine. In Tonaldi, a car driven
by th'e petitioner was stopped for proceeding through a red light. A police officer
approached the car, saw a bag of white powder on the front seat and arrested all
three persons in the car. The three were later indicted for unlawful possession of
cocaine and retained a single lawyer for their defense. At trail, each defendant denied
ownership of the cocaine and each alleged lack of knowledge that the bag contained
cocaine. One of the co-defendants testified that she first saw the dark vinyl bag (con-
taining the drug) "on the floor of the front of the car" when the driver picked her
up at home (the third defendant had not yet been picked up). The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that an actual conflict manifested itself when the defense
attorney called the petitioner's co-defendants to the stand and elicited the above
1984]
Larsen: When Constitutional Rights Clash:  The Duty of the Trial Judge in
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
652 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
flict arises when one defendant attempts to clear himself by implicating
a co-defendant." The single attorney in this situation is forced to repre-
sent two defendants whose interests are completely in opposition. He
must decide whether or not to attack the credibility of the inculpating
defendant in order to properly defend the defendant inculpated. But
if he chooses to do so, the attorney will breach his ethical duty to
defend the testifying defendant to the fullest extent possible. If he
chooses not to do so, he will likewise be in breach of the same ethical
duty he owes to the inculpated defendant. 12
Special problems confront the attorney when co-defendants testify
at trial. Even when co-defendants intend to present a unified defense
strategy," the pressures of trial may force a defendant to inadvertently
testify to something which tends to harm his co-defendant." Likewise,
testimony inculpating the petitioner. Id. at 433. See also HAWAII SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY BOARD, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 78-1-12 (1978) (existence of inconsistent
defenses constitutes one reason for finding multiple representation of criminal defen-
dants a violation of ethical standards).
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Anderson, 689 F.2d 59, 66 n.9 (6th Cir. 1982). In Smith,
X and Y were jointly represented against a robbery charge. Their defenses were
antagonistic because X admitted being in the store when it was robbed and was im-
plicated by all but one res gestae witness, while Y himself claimed he was not at
the scene of the robbery and was implicated by only one res gestae witness. The
court held that counsel's ability to bolster Y's defense suffered due to counsel's in-
ability to highlight the lesser number of witnesses adverse to Y and lesser incriminating
acts to which those witnesses testified. Thus, Y was denied the effective assistance
of counsel.'Id. at 64-66.
12. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Nos. 4, 6, and 7 (1970) require
an attorney to be loyal, competent, and zealous. A conflict may make it impossible
for counsel to simultaneously adhere to these principles of conduct. if counsel tempers
the aggressiveness of his representation to accommodate a conflict or to prevent its
emergence, he is failing to zealously represent one of his clients. Likewise, if he decides
not to adopt a certain approach or defense that would aid one of his clients to prevent
harming another, his loyalty and even his competence may be called into question.
See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1045 (1st Cir. 1977) (alternative
strategy available for one co-defendant but harmful to another; conflict because defen-
dant and co-defendant represented by members of the same firm); Alvarez v. Wain-
wright, 522 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1975) (attorney who advised against petitioner
testifying at trial on ground that it would hurt co-defendant who was also attorney's
client rendered ineffective assistance to petitioner).
13. In a unified defense strategy, each co-defendant attempts to present the
same story and this eliminates many of the problems of antagonistic defenses between
co-defendants. The advantages of this strategy are discussed infra notes 98-105 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W2d 733 (1969) (A defendant
testifying at trial may exculpate a co-defendant and inculpate himself in the process);
People v. Perry, 242 Cal. App. 2d 724, 51 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1966) (A defendant may plead
guilty, but before he is sentenced, the prosecution calls him as a witness against a
co-defendant); Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1980) (A defendant may
be impeached in his testimony by a statement that inculpates his co-defendant); United
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 3
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a defendant on the stand may decide to entirely abandon the unified
defense and suddenly switch his position, attempting to put sole blame
on a co-defendant. The attorney-client privilege will be placed in
danger if the attorney now attempts to use confidential information
obtained from one defendant to cross-examine the other."5 In these
situations, the attorney is placed in a dilemma which prevents him
from meaningfully representing either defendant. For whatever ac-
tion he chooses, or even if he chooses no action at all," he is breaching
a duty which he steadfastly owes to each of his clients.
Conflicts of interest can also arise due to factual circumstances
which often require counsel to offer evidence which assists one co-
defendant but adversely affects others. 7 Such factual antagonism is
probable in almost every multiple representation case, because due
to human nature, each defendant's version of the facts is based on
his own subjective evaluation and will inevitably be somewhat dif-
ferent than the others. 8 Moreover, in almost every crime that takes
place, co-defendants are not identically culpable. Every conspiracy has
a leader, and an attorney cannot adequately represent this leader if
he also represents a follower. 9
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973) (one defendant testified and on cross-
examination incriminated his non-testifying co-defendant, represented by the same
attorney).
15. The problem is that the attorney may have gained privileged information
from one co-defendant that is relevant to cross-examination, but which he refuses to
use for fear of breaching his ethical obligation to maintain the confidences of his client.
See, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, DR 4-101(B)2). One situation where
this can occur is where defense counsel is unable to cross-examine a prosecution witness
effectively because the attorney also represented the witness. See United States v.
Mavrick, 601 F.2d 921, 931 (7th Cir. 1979). This problem can also occur when a defen-
dant shifts loyalty or a part of his testimony damages a co-defendant. The attorney
is unable to provide effective representation if he has gained from one of his co-
defendants privileged information which could help one yet would harm the other.
See United States v. Burroughs, 650 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. See supra note 12.
17. See, e.g., Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 1980) (conflict exists
where one attorney represents co-defendants and one defendant agrees to provide
evidence against the other in return for an advantageous plea bargain). United States
v. Kranzthor, 614 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1980) (conflict is present "whenever one defen-
dant stands to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence or advancing
plausible arguments that are damaging to the cause of a co-defendant whom counsel
is also representing"). See also United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977).
18. See Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of In-
terest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV.
119, 135-36 (1978).
19. In United States v. Flanagan, 527 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Penn. (1981), affd,
679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1101 (1984), the district
court judge disqualified joint counsel because not all four defendants were charged
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Attempts by the prosecution to plea bargain with one of several
co-defendants to obtain his testimony against other co-defendants will
also give rise to an unresolvable conflict of interest.20 While it may
be in a particular defendant's best interest to accept a government
plea offer, his attorney is at a loss to advise him to do so because
acceptance of an offer would undoubtedly have an adverse affect on
the remaining defendants.2 But failure to advise a client to accept
a plea that is in his best interest would render the attorney's represen-
tation ineffective as to this client.' In our system of criminal justice,
approximately 90 percent of the prosecutions filed are disposed of pur-
suant to a plea bargain.2' Attempts to plea bargain are made in vir-
in every count of the alleged conspiracy, therefore making it "immediately apparent
from reading the indictment ... that each defendant's involvement may vary significant-
ly from that of the others." Id. at 904. The judge in Flanagan also found that a con-
flict was likely to develop since under the factual circumstances of the case, it ap-
peared that defendant Flanagan was the "leader" of the alleged conspiracy. This would
mean that the government would probably introduce more evidence tending to im-
plicate defendant Flanagan and thus (a) the jury might infer that the others were
also guilty because of the joint representation and (b) defense efforts might be more
concentrated toward the defense of Flanagan. Id. at 903. It should be noted that the
law firm representing the four co-defendants allegedly wished to present a unified
defense, which normally minimizes the likelihood that an unacceptable conflict will
arise. The way in which such dangers are minimized is discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 172-77. The plausibility of such a defense in Flanagan is discussed infra
note 173.
20. The plea bargaining process itself has been subject to extensive criticism.
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether such a
bargain is constitutionally permissible. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8
(1976). See United States v. Laura, 667 F.2d 365, 379-80 (1981) (Stern, J., dissenting)
("where, as here, both elements are merged-where a plea agreement is entered into
in order to obtain lenient treatment for a co-defendant represented by the same
lawyer-the situation becomes intolerable.").
21. See, e.g., Houmis v. United States, 558 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons,
J., concurring) (guilty plea could have been disallowed for sole reason that petitioner's
attorney simultaneously represented two other defendants); Alvarez, 522 F.2d at 105
(attorney who advised against petitioner's acceptance of plea bargain on ground that
it would hurt co-defendant who was also attorney's client rendered ineffective assistance
to petitioner by sixth amendment standards); United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117,
120-21 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring) (serious conflicts may arise when one or
more jointly represented defendants pleads guilty).
22. See FLORIDA BAR COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ETHICS OPINIONS, No.
72-50 (1973) (proper efforts must include attempt to obtain immunity). See also Matter
of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976); United States
ex rel Horta v. DeYoung, 523 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel Hart v.
Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620
(N.J. 1977).
23. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (estimation that
90-95 percent of all criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas). In 1978,
approximately 68 percent of defendants in federal courts pleaded guilty or nolo con-
tendere. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 114 (1978).
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tually every criminal case. Thus, this type of conflict is present in
almost every multiple representation case and poses a serious threat
to a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Less obvious conflicts can occur due to the necessity of making
comparisons between co-defendants in order to represent each defen-
dant's best interests. A defense lawyer clearly has an obligation to
serve the best interests of each of his clients. This obligation includes
segregating particular attributes of his client at the expense of the
other defendants.24 Segregation is often necessary during sentencing
or plea bargaining, when a lawyer can base his appeal for favorable
treatment on the limited involvement of his client as opposed to the
others.' Similarly, during closing argument at trial, it would constitute
a breach of duty to fail to emphasize an individual defendant's minimal
culpability by comparing his conduct with that of a co-defendant. Yet
where joint counsel does compare his multiple clients on argument
to the jury, courts have held that the second defendant has been
denied effective assistance of counsel."
24. See People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 775, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 16, 447 P.2d
106, 112 (1968) (Traynor, C. J.) (Counsel" . . . must be free to stress particular mitigating
elements in his client's background or other individual mitigating factors that may
not apply to a co-defendant. Counsel representing more than one defendant is necessarily
inhibited in making such argument . . . "); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of In-
terest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1381 (1981) ("By making comparisons
between defendants, or by failing to make such comparisons, the lawyer will sacrifice
the interests of one client to those of another."). See also supra note 11.
25. In United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d 445, 451 (8th Cir. 1983) two defen-
dants, Crystal and Robert, were represented by a single attorney and pleaded guilty
to kidnapping. They both were given a fifty-year sentence. The court found that the
only aggravating factor in the kidnapping charge was an injury to the infant and that
Crystal was not present when the injury occurred. Id. at 450-51. The court further
reasoned that Crystal's counsel, if he had not also represented Robert, would have
argued that her lack of involvement with the injury made her less culpable than Robert;
and thus, she should receive a lighter sentence. This failure by counsel to distance
Crystal from the aggravating injury at the time of sentencing was held to have denied
her the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 451. Especially where there are marked-
ly different degrees of relative culpability, a likelihood of conflict exists because of
the necessity of comparison. See, e.g., Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (where not all defen-
dants are charged in every count of an alleged conspiracy, a conflict of interest is
likely to arise); Camera v. Fogg, 658 F.2d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1981) (where potential duress
defense of two of three defendants was supported by some evidence, multiple represen-
tation of all three defendants charged with kidnapping violated defendants' sixth amend-
ment right to counsel). See also supra note 11.
26. See, e.g., Hart, 478 F.2d at 208-09 (petitioner denied effective assistance
of counsel where defense attorney who represented five other defendants made no
attempt in his closing argument to differentiate petitioner's position from that of his
co-defendants').
27. See, e.g., Caddie v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 192, 193, 238 A.2d 129, 129 (1968)
(defendant denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel privately retained to
represent defendant at trial was appointed by court to represent co-defendant, and
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Conflicts of interest are invariably present in multiple represen-
tation cases because there exists the possibility that the interests of
co-defendants will be divergent. If a conflict does arise, the attorney
is placed in an ethical dilemma: any action on his part to accommodate
one party can devastate his obligation to the other.' This ethical dilem-
ma is recognized by the drafters of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility." The Model Code states that a lawyer may represent
multiple clients with conflicting interests, but only if consent is ob-
tained after full disclosure and "if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interests of each."' This approach places on the attorney
the burden of anticipating potential conflicts, fully advising a defen-
dant about them and making a decision about whether to continue
joint representation if his clients wish to do so.
While the dangers of multiple representation are grave, many
courts follow the Model Code approach and do nothing before trial
to insure that a defendant appreciates these dangers and intelligently
chooses between his two competing constitutional rights.31 Most courts
merely place the entire burden of locating conflicts and fairly advis-
ing their clients about such conflicts on the defense attorney.2 The
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility likewise notes that avoiding
a conflict is primarily the responsibility of the attorney.' Unfortunate-
the attorney, in argument to jury, stated that there was more evidence against defen-
dant than against co-defendant).
28. See supra note 12.
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(C) (1980).
30. DR 5-105 provides in part that:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR-104(A) and (B), a lawyer may repre-
sent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION, S 3.5(b) (1974).
31. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, S 3.4(b)
(1972) which explains that if a lawyer represents "multiple clients having potentially
differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 3
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ly, because of many factors including the inability to accurately predict
what conflicts may occur, an attorney often cannot adequately carry
out this responsibility.- Placing the sole burden on the attorney may
prevent a few conflicts, but as is evidenced by the increasing number
of post-conviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
due to joint representation,' placing responsibility on the attorney
alone is clearly not an adequate solution. Under the present system,
a defendant who fails to object at trial has as his sole remedy a post-
conviction claim that his joint representation denied him the effec-
tive assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The
problem is that placing the burden on the attorney to prevent con-
flicts, in conjunction with post-conviction review, is an inadequate
method of protecting constitutional rights in multiple representation
cases. 38
B. The Ineffectiveness of Post-Conviction Review of Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A major practical problem with post-conviction review is that
many types of conflicts will not readily appear on a trial court record.
Such conflicts are no less serious and damaging to a defendant's con-
stitutional rights merely because they are less visible. Unfortunately,
a reviewing court can only look at what is presented before it in the
form of a printed record." This printed record will reveal overt con-
flicts such as where one of two co-defendants takes the stand and
impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment, and he
is to resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation." See also ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, S 3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971). The ap-
proved draft concluded that the "potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than
one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investiga-
tion, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants
give an informed consent to such multiple representation."
34. Many factors militate against the effectiveness of requiring the attorney
to bear the sole burden of avoiding conflicts. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying
text.
35. See Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Approach,
64 VA. L. REv. 939, 950-51 n.40 (1978) (survey of public defender offices); see also Tague,
Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075,
1075 n.2 (1979).
36. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
37. An appellate court is limited to a consideration of only such questions
as are properly presented by the record or the requisite part thereof. Eisenberg v.
Superior Court, 142 C.A.2d 12, 297 P.2d 803 (1956); Bryand v. Kuhn, 73 So. 2d 675
(Fla. 1954); Sheridan v. State, 124 N.E.2d 701, 125 Ind. App. 271 (1955); Corey v. Car-
buck, 201 Md. 389, 94 A.2d 629 (1953); Loehde v. Rudnick, 409 111. 73, 98 N.E.2d 719 (1951).
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inculpates the other"' or destroys a silent defendant's defense. 9 But
as is often the case, certain types of conflicts will not appear on the
record. For instance, if one defendant does not testify out of deference
to another, there is an obvious conflict which is invisible to an ap-
pellate court since the decision whether to testify is made privately.0
Likewise, where a defendant is offered the chance to plead guilty and
receive a reduced sentence provided that he testifies against his co-
defendant, the record will reveal no conflict if the lawyer representing
both defendants advises against the plea."1
Conflicts that do not appear on a trial court record are especially
dangerous not only because of what they cause a lawyer to do, but
also because of what they tend to cause a lawyer to refrain from do-
ing. For example, an attorney may recognize the existence of a poten-
tial conflict and attempt to reconcile it by failing to vigorously ques-
tion a defendant who takes the stand and offers evidence unfavorable
to a co-defendant. The Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas,'"
observed that joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing, not on-
ly at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in
the sentencing process. Any effort to reconcile a potential conflict
prevents it from appearing in its full context on the record.'" Without
a record of what counsel knew and why he acted as he did, post-
conviction courts are forced to speculate as to factual issues in deter-
mining whether to grant relief."
38. White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967). See also supra note 14.
39. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448; Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant
waived his right to present a witness in his behalf; advice given by attorney who
owed an obligation to the witness who was a former client); United States v. Gaines,
529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976); Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968)
(question as to whether the several defendants should take the stand).
41. See, e.g., Alvarez, 522 F.2d 100; see also supra notes 20-21.
42. 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978).
43. O'Kelly v. State, 606 F.2d 56, 58 (4th Cir. 1979) (attorney failed to introduce
evidence in mitigation of one defendant's sentence for fear of harming other co-
defendants with that evidence). See, e.g., Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.
1973) (one attorney represented accused and her co-defendant in trial for homicide
of child; accused was denied effective assistance of counsel where defense of lack of
responsibility was not developed because of counsel's divided loyalties and possible
damage to co-defendant).
44. The Supreme Court in Holloway did just this and speculated about the
probability that a conflict occurred as well as the effect of the conflict. Holloway, 435
U.S. at 490. This problem of estimating the prejudice to a jointly represented defen-
dant caused by alleged conflicts has led to the current rule presuming prejudice if
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Reviewing courts are nonetheless called upon to determine
whether a conflict of interest has denied a defendant his sixth amend-
ment right to effective counsel. Adding to the problem that conflicts
are often undetectable in a trial record, the standard of review that
has been developed for these cases is vague and has been applied
aimlessly to a variety of factual settings. The current standard of
review for claims involving ineffective counsel has developed from
three Supreme Court cases dealing with multiple representation.
The first Supreme Court case to deal with post-conviction claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel due to joint representation was
Glasser v. United States, decided in 1942." Glasser held that the
"assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment con-
templates that such assistance be untrammelled and unimpaired by
a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously repre-
sent conflicting interests.""' The Court unfortunately gave no real
guidance as to the degree of conflict or prejudice required for rever-
sal when no objection to joint representation was made at trial. It
merely held that when a defendant is denied separate counsel over
a timely objection, a court must grant relief without indulging in "nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."'"
a defendant can show that an "actual conflict adversely affected his lawyers perfor-
mance." See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). Note that a defendant on
a post-conviction review must still prove an "actual conflict" occurred at trial. Because
of the difficulty of obtaining affirmative proof as to the existence of a conflict, many
defendants cannot meet this burden even when conflicts did in fact exist. See infra
notes 74-78 and accompanying text. See also Unger, 665 F.2d at 254 (court speculated
about a negative fact that an attorney's divided loyalty made it impossible for him
to use his best efforts to exonerate one defendant for fear of implicating another);
Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (defendant waived his right to present a witness in his behalf on
basis of advice from an attorney who owed an obligation to the witness who was a
former client; court forced to speculate that the obligation "may well have" conflicted
with the attorney's duty to the defendant).
45. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id. at 76. The major reason that some of the statements in Glasser are
not very helpful is that no court today would require joint representation over a defen-
dant's objection as was the case in Glasser. The problem in modern joint representa-
tion cases is that many defendants expressly wish to proceed with joint counsel or
at least make no objection to it, and later wish to attack their convictions on sixth
amendment grounds. The Glasser decision made no statements regarding the stan-
dard for post-conviction review of such cases. This is not to say that Glasser is wholly
without worth. The case was the first to recognize the problems of proving prejudice
in this area, which led to the current rule that if an "actual" conflict can be shown,
no separate showing of prejudice is required as prejudice will be assumed to have
occurred due to the conflict. See supra note 44. Likewise, Glasser established the fun-
damental principle that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless er-
ror. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
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The extent to which a trial judge has a duty to act in joint represen-
tation cases was similiarly left open except that the Court noted that
"upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is con-
ducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused."'" The
nebulous requirements in Glasser thus provided no definitive answers
for lower courts which continued to struggle with the problems of
joint representation.
Thirty-five years later, in Holloway v. Arkansas,"5 the Supreme
Court again addressed the joint representation problem. Like Glasser,
the Court only made the limited holding that a state trial court must
investigate timely objections to multiple representation.' The Court
expressly reserved opinion on the two crucial issues that have plagued
appellate courts since Glasser was handed down." First, the Supreme
Court in Holloway did not rule on whether the trial court has an
affirmative obligation to inquire into all cases of joint representation
to determine if an actual or potential conflict will deprive a defen-
dant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 2 Second,
Holloway did not say what degree of conflict must be shown before
a reviewing court should determine that a defendant has been denied
adequate representation in violation of the sixth amendment." Thus,
until the Supreme Court decided these issues two years later, appellate
courts in each of the circuits applied a wide variety of standards to
post-conviction claims of inadequate counsel due to joint
representation.8 This led to a great deal of confusion over the proper
standard and its application to different cases.
48. Id. at 71.
49. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). In Holloway, one attorney was appointed to represent
three co-defendants at a state criminal trial. The attorney, Harold Hall, before trial
objected to his continued representation of all three defendants and moved for
appointment of separate counsel based on the possibility for conflict because of con-
fidential information he received from the co-defendants. The trial judge denied the
motion for separate counsel. Hall again renewed his motion prior to impanelment of
the jury and it was again denied. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge com-
mitted reversible error by failing to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate
steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was too remote to warrant separate
counsel. Id. at 484.
50. Id. at 484.
51. Id. at 483-84.
52. Id. at 483.
53. Id.
54. Prior to Cuyler, courts applied varying standards of review to post-
conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to joint representation. Many
courts required a specific showing of prejudice, which often was an impossible burden
to meet since many conflicts cause an attorney to refrain from acting in a particular
manner. Any prejudice resulting from lack of action is thus incapable of concrete proof.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss3/3
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
These two crucial issues expressly reserved by Holloway were
finally decided two years later in Cuyler v. Sullivan." In Cuyler, two
privately retained attorneys represented three defendants in a double-
murder trial." Petitioner Sullivan had previously retained a different
attorney for the preliminary hearing, but due to lack of money
accepted his two co-defendants' offer to share their counsel at trial. 7
The prosecution was then granted a motion to sever the trial. At
Sullivan's trial, joint counsel decided to rest their defense at the con-
clusion of the state's case without allowing Sullivan to testify on his
own behalf.' Sullivan was convicted of both murders. His two co-
defendants were subsequently acquitted."
The Supreme Court first held that in the absence of a timely
objection or other special circumstances, state trial courts have no
duty to initiate an inquiry into the propriety of joint representation
under the sixth amendment."0 The Cuyler Court ruled that "absent
special circumstances"' ... trial courts may assume either that multi-
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. For cases where the defendant's claim of
prejudice was rejected see Courtney v. Untied States, 486 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Irons, 475 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973); United
States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973); United
States v. Horne, 423 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Ford v. United States 379
F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Tague, supra note 35 at 1089-91 (describing the variety
of approaches taken by the federal courts of appeal before Cuyler).
55. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Cuyler, the Supreme Court was finally forced to
face these issues in light of the lower court's application of a standard for post-conviction
review that was felt to be clearly overbroad. The Third Circuit had held that even
a remote possibility that a conflict of interest occurred at trial requires reversal. United
States ex rel Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 522 (3d Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court
felt that the standard was overbroad because the possibility of a conflict inheres in
every multiple representation case. The Third Circuit's standard would thus require
reversal of every joint representation case, amounting to a per se rule banning joint
representation. While many writers have urged a per se rule, such a rule would arguably
violate a defendant's constitutional right to choice of counsel under circumstances where
the dangers of joint representation are outweighed by the advantages of proceeding
with joint counsel. See infra text accompanying notes 79-97.
56. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 338.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 346. Although the Court "approved of" Rule 44(c) procedures, it
nonetheless held that nothing in the Constitution mandates it. Id. at 346 n.10. This
holding has led to the general practice among the Circuits of failing to hold Rule 44(c)
inquiries. See infra note 83. Like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Approach,
the Court noted that ordinarily the burden of revealing the existence of a conflict
rests on defense counsel as an ethical matter. See supra note 33.
61. Cuyler held that only in "special circumstances" does a trial court have
a sua sponte duty to inquire into the propriety of joint representation. But the mere
fact of joint representation is not a special circumstance. A potential conflict does not
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pie representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients
knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. ' 60 Cuyler then
established the current constitutional standard for finding a violation
of the sixth amendment on review of post-conviction claims of inef-
fective counsel where no objection is made to joint representation at
trial. The Court held that "in order to establish a violation of the
sixth amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.""3 Thus, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
validity of the traditional method of dealing with the dangers of multi-
ple representation." Cuyler in effect holds that post-conviction review
for actual conflicts combined with the ethical duty of the attorney
to avoid conflicts sufficiently protects a defendant's fundamental right
to effective counsel.6 5
There are many problems with both prongs of the Cuyler deci-
sion which have a direct bearing on the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of criminal defendants. The first prong decides that the attorney
has the sole responsibility of recognizing and adequately advising his
trigger the duty to investigate; rather, an inquiry need by initiated only when the
trial judge "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists." Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 347.
62. Id. at 346-47. The view that the trial court may presume that no conflict
exists absent an objection must be overcome to argue that the duty of a trial judge
to inquire comes into effect due to the fact of joint representation itself. See infra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 350. The Court went on to hold that a defendant need not
demonstrate prejudice resulting from the inadequate representation. This reaffirmed
the statement in Glasser that once it is shown that an actual conflict adversely affected
a lawyer's performance, a court must grant relief without indulging in "nice calcula-
tions as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
The Cuyler court did, however, emphasize that the test for reversal on appeal con-
tains two prongs, both of which must be satisfied to invoke the above presumption:
1) an actual conflict must be proven to have 2) adversely affected the adequacy of
the attorney's representation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350.
64. Id. at 346-47.
65. Id. The following statement made by the Second Circuit more than 17
years ago in United States v. Pazsierra, 367 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 935 (1967) is still indicative of the philosophy of most courts:
No facts have thus far been presented that the Bar of this country is
so unmindful of the canons of ethics and its obligation to avoid positions
of conflict as to call for a pre-trial cross-examination of defendants and
their counsel on the theory, or even presumptuous presumption, that
counsel will not be faithful to the best interests of their clients and when
aware of any conflict of interest between clients jointly represented
whether before or during trial will not disclose it to the court and seek
appropriate relief.
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clients about potential conflicts that may hinder his effectiveness.6
This approach proceeds on the assumption that an attorney will always
discuss every relevant potential conflict with his clients and advise
them fully and fairly. 7 Many factors, however, militate against this
assumption.
One factor is that there are instances where an attorney may
misjudge the extent of the conflict, or fail to recognize its existence
at all. 8 The difficulty of predicting before trial what conflicts may
arise makes it almost impossible for a defendant to be fully informed
of the dangers of multiple representation."9 This factor alone makes
it highly unlikely that a defendant will ever be able to intelligently
waive his right to separate representation.0 Moreover, any advice
given to him by his attorney about whether to proceed with joint
representation is clearly not disinterested and neutral.' Similarly, some
66. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344.
67. It is clear that to protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to separate
counsel that co-defendants must be advised from some source about the dangers of
multiple representation. If attorneys have a hard time recognizing the existence of
conflicts, defendants themselves surely will not be in a position to note their existence
and request that their lawyer object to the joint representation. See infra notes 68-72.
68. See, e.g., Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038; see also United States v. Carrigan, 543
F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976) (even the most diligent attorney may be unaware of facts
giving rise to a conflict of interest). Often "counsel must operate somewhat in the
dark and feel their way uncertainly to an understanding of what their clients may
be called upon to meet upon a trial" and consequently "are frequently unable to foresee
developments which may require changes in strategy." Carrigan, 543 F.2d at 1058.
69. See United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 969 (1978) ("Because the conflicts are often subtle it is often not enough to
rely upon counsel, who may not be totally disinterested, to make sure that each of
his joint clients has made an effective waiver.").
70. Especially if lawyers fail to properly appraise the dangers involved, "laymen
simply are not equipped to appraise" the considerations involved. Hart, 478 F.2d at
203. This is true even of the "educated" layman. Gaines, 529 F.2d at 1044. In Carrigan,
543 F.2d at 1058 Lumbard, J., concurring, stated that, "it would be a rare defendant
who could intelligently decide whether his interests will be properly served by counsel
who also represents another defendant . . . Even defense counsel, who all too fre-
quently are not adequately informed regarding the evidence available about their clients,
may not be in a position to judge whether a conflict of interest between their clients
may develop." Other less obvious factors also militate against a defendant every be-
ing in a position to voluntarily waive his right to separate representation. For exam-
ple, there are social and economic pressures on co-defendants not to break ranks that
can be exerted on an individual defendant by his peers. See Lowenthal, supra note
35 at n.63. Likewise, joint representation can be used coercively to insulate the leaders
of a criminal enterprise more effectively against the dangers that other co-defendants
will become prosecution witnesses. Id. at 969. See also infra note 101.
71. The difficulty of obtaining competent, disinterested advice on whether to
waive the right to separate representation had led some courts to require the trial
1984]
Larsen: When Constitutional Rights Clash:  The Duty of the Trial Judge in
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
664 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
writers have even suggested that fee arrangements can materially
affect the judgment of both the client and the lawyer."2 Finally, the
sheer number of jointly represented defendants who continue to appeal
convictions due to alleged conflicts evidences the ineffectiveness of
the traditional approach"3 as required by the first prong of the Cuyler
decision.
The second prong of the Cuyler decision held that reversal will
occur only if a defendant can show an actual conflict of interest and
that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance." As
previously noted, the fact that many conflicts are not apparent from
a trial court record may make this burden of showing an actual con-
flict an impossible one for the defendant to meet. 5 Because many
actual conflicts are not susceptible of concrete proof, courts are forc-
ed to speculate as to the likelihood that an alleged conflict did in fact
court to warn and advise co-defendants. See Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053; Hart, 478 F.2d
203; United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972); Campbell v. United States,
352 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
72. While not suggesting that monetary concerns prompt lawyers to purposely
suggest joint representation to clients, the concern for a fee may lead retained lawyers
to overlook conflicts more frequently than would public defenders or appointed private
counsel. See Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple Representation Should Be Stopped, 2
NAT. J. CRIM. DEF. 149 (1976) (fee considerations contribute to making multiple represen-
tation a "defense lawyers dream"). Note that a lawyer receiving a double fee for
representing two defendants may lose his entire fee by suggesting the co-defendants
retain separate counsel. Many courts who are given notice of a conflict will disqualify
joint counsel entirely from the case because of the presumption that privileged infor-
mation has been obtained which would prejudice the defendant who is no longer being
represented. United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1004-05 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co., Inc., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.
1979). See also Camera, 658 F.2d at 90 ("there is a great likelihood in any multiple
representation situation that one defendant may attempt to override the will of the
others. This is particularly so where one defendant assumes the burden of paying
counsel fees for all"); Hart, 478 F.2d 203 (conflict found where an employee had been
represented by an attorney paid for by his co-defendants who were his employers).
73. See supra note 35.
74. See supra text accompanying note 63.
75. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Holloway:
In a case of joint representation of conflicting interests, the evil-it
bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing ... It may be possible in some case to identify from the record
the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain
trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available
it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the
attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict
of interest on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotia-
tions would be virtually impossible. (emphasis in original).
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91.
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exist at trial." The vagueness of the Cuyler standard has also caused
reviewing courts to employ differing tests in deciding whether an
alleged conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's performance."7
76. The necessity of speculating about whether an actual conflict existed at
trial can lead to inaccurate results. See, e.g., United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907,
917 (7th Cir. 1983). In Bradshaw, two jointly represented defendants were convicted
of conspiracy to steal goods moving in interstate commerce and the underlying offense.
Defendant Bradshaw claimed that an actual conflict was created by the government's
plea offer requiring that an accepting defendant cooperate with the government. Such
cooperation raised the possibility that the accepting defendant might ultimately implicate
the non-accepting defendant. Bradshaw argued that since his acceptance of the plea
offer might have seriously damaged his co-defendant's defense, a result that joint counsel
wanted to avoid, "the dual representation likely prevented defendant's counsel from
advising the defendant whether he should accept the plea offer." Id. The court replied
that "this argument is completely without merit and borders on frivolous," because
evidence showed that Bradshaw's counsel did in fact advise him regarding the govern-
ment's plea offer. It seems the court in this context failed to recognize the possibility
that Bradshaw's attorney may have been unable to fully advise him about all the possible
options, including accepting a government plea offer. It is quite probable that Brad-
shaw's attorney did not suggest acceptance of the plea offer as strongly as he would
have had Bradshaw been his only client. It is precisely this probability that has led
other courts to hold that the mere existence of a plea offer amounts to proof of an
actual conflict of interest. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Some courts
have articulated certain circ'umstances under which an "actual" conflict will be found.
See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011
(1982) (an actual conflict exists if "counsel's introduction of probative evidence or plausi-
ble arguments that would significantly benefit one defendant would damage the defense
of another defendant whom the same counsel is representing"); United States v. Mers,
701 F.2d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 1983) ("where co-defendants' statements are largely cor-
roborative, repetitive, or serve the same purpose, there is no conflict.") Even with
these standards a court must still speculate as to the existence of these circumstances
where a defendant alleges that his attorney failed to act in a certain way because
of a conflict. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Moreover, many courts
place on the defendant the burden of making a factual showing of inconsistent in-
terests and must demonstrate that the attorney "made a choice between possible alter-
native courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one
client but harmful to the other. If he did not make such a choice, the conflict remain-
ed hypothetical." Note, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-
defendants, 68 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (1977) (parenthesis in original). See
also U.S. v. Fox, 613 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1980) ("we will not find an actual conflict
unless appellants can point to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual
conflict or impairment of their interests.")
77. In the past, courts generally held that an attorney's assistance was inef-
fective only if his ineptitude or disloyalty reduced the trial to "a farce or mockery
of justice." See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945). Then in 1970, the Supreme Court suggested that an attorney's performance
must be "within the range of competence demanded of attorney's in criminal cases."
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Yet, courts have failed to precisely define
what this "range of competence" requires. It may well be that trying to state a precise
test in this area is an impossible task, and any requirement that a defendant must
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Moreover, even recent tests employ a highly deferential approach,
finding an adverse effect on a lawyer's performance only in extreme
cases. 8 The result is that courts must first speculate on the factual
issue of whether an actual conflict was present at trial; then they
must apply that speculation to a vague and deferential standard in
an effort to determine whether reversal should occur. Clearly such
an approach cannot be said to adequately protect a defendant's con-
stitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL
CUYLER APPROACH
A. Per Se Ban of Joint Representation
One view of joint representation is that the danger to a defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel is so great as to outweigh
in all instances a defendant's right to choose to be jointly represented."
somehow prove inadequacy of his attorney will necessarily be a vague requirement.
In addition to the vagueness problem, courts generally find inadequate representation
only where it is blatantly obvious that an attorney's conduct is the result of a conflict.
For some recent statements of what constitutes "adequate representation" see Guzzardo
v. Bengston, 643 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) ("A minimum
standard of professional representation does not mean representation free of ques-
tionable tactical decisions or even what hindsight might suggest were mistakes. It
means representation without serious prejudicial blunders which have foreseeable
adverse consequences. Implicit in the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal
cases is the notion of adequacy.") Parker v. Parratt, 622 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 102 (1982) ("Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the
fray so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used. Trial counsel's strategy
will vary even among the most skilled lawyers. When the judgment exercised turns
out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim
of ineffective counsel ... In order to assert a sixth amendment infirmity on this ground,
the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer's deliberate
abdication of this ethical duty to this client. There must be such conscious conduct
as to render pretextual an attorney's legal obligation to fairly represent the defen-
dant.") Due to the deferential nature of the test for adequacy, many courts that have
identified actual conflicts have refused to reverse when they find that the conflict
did not affect the adequacy of the attorney's representation. See, e.g., Laura, 667 F.2d
at 372; Bordenkircher, 671 F.2d 986 (even if there was an actual conflict of interest,
it did not interfere with counsel's ability to represent the defendant).
78. Bordenkircher, 671 F.2d 986.
79. See, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 35, at 989 (advocating a per se rule ban-
ning joint representation); United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1238 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., concurring); Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("The
right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount
in the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take
precedence over all other considerations including the expressed preference of the
defendants concerned and their attorney.")
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Thus, advocates of this view urge the adoption of a per se rule banning
joint representation. A per se rule such as this would clearly take
care of the problems involved in post-conviction review of these cases
because they would no longer arise. It is also clear that one major
constitutional problem would be eliminated: sixth amendment viola-
tions of the right to effective counsel caused by the conflicts of joint
representation. This solution would also be the easiest to implement;
far easier than holding hearings that try to predict future conflicts,
and far easier than reviews of trial court records in an effort to
discover alleged past conflicts."0
Given these obvious advantages of a per se rule, the question
remains why such a rule has not taken hold and been given widespread
support by the courts. While a per se rule has been accepted for
assigned counsel in some jurisdictions, a per se rule with regard to
retained counsel implicates another right of a criminal defendant also
derived from the sixth amendment: the constitutional right of a defen-
dant to freely choose who he wants to represent him.82 Many courts
hold that this kind of right is one of the rights the framers of our
Constitution meant to protect in passing the sixth amendment.8 It
80. Another possible approach that has been suggested by some courts is to
hold post-trial hearings in an attempt to locate past conflicts. See, e.g, Morgan, 396
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968); Alvarez, 522 F.2d 100; United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769,
772-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970). While this approach is arguably a
more effective way of locating past conflicts, it involves many of the same problems
of traditional post-conviction review. For example:
1) Waste of judicial machinery-a full trial must still take place. If a conflict is found,
the case must be remanded for a new trial with new attorneys.
2) Same problem of speculation as to amount of harm and as to whether an actual
conflict occurred. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
3) The judge cannot inquire too far into privileged information when trying to find
a conflict. Even though a defendant waives the attorney-client privilege when attack-
ing the effectiveness of his counsel, many attorneys are understandably hesitant to
reveal such information.
4) Finally, this method relies too heavily on the lawyer, who may have caused the
conflict, to acknowledge his initial misjudgment. See Gaines, 529 F.2d at 1045 (7th Cir.
1976).
81. Mandating that indigent co-defendants accept separate counsel when they
specifically request joint counsel may cause constitutional problems similar to when
co-defendants who retain joint counsel are required to accept separate representation.
Some circuits, however, have held that such a ban with regard to assigned counsel
would pass constitutional muster. See e.g. Gaines, 529 F.2d at 1044 n.4; Morgan, 396
F.2d 110; Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 564 (1969); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
82. See infra note 93.
83. As Judge Friendly recently wrote, "the defendants' choice of joint represen-
tation, like that of self-representation, may sometimes seem woefully foolish to the
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is derived from basic notions of freedom and rights of individual
autonomy that the founding forefathers of the United States so deeply
valued and sought to protect." The arbitrary action of the govern-
ment against such a choice as advocated by those urging a per se
rule would be contrary to these basic notions.
It is precisely these notings of the sanctity of individual choice
that led the Supreme Court in 1975 in Farretta v. California5 to hold
that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to proceed pro se and
represent himself if his choice is voluntarily and intelligently made."
Opponents of a per se ban on joint representation argue that because
of this right, a criminal defendant a fortiori has the right to waive
separate representation and potential conflicts. 7 The problem with
this argument is that unlike self-representation, joint representation
creates ethical problems for the attorneys involved88 and impedes a
judge. But... the choice is mainly theirs; the judge is ... not to assume too paternalistic
an attitude in protecting the defendant from himself." Curcio, 614 F.2d at 25 (emphasis
in original); cf. Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (to force a lawyer on
the petitioner may have convinced him that the law contrives against him). See also
Adams v. United States ez rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1943) stating that "what
were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters. To
forbid the waiver of a protected right would be to imprison a man in his privileges
and call it a constitution." See also infra notes 84-86.
84. The Supreme Court in Farretta stated that "freedom of choice is not a
stranger to the constitutional design of procedural protections for a defendant in a
criminal proceeding. For example, every criminal defendant is privileged to testify
in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." Farretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.45. (citations
omitted) Moreover, "S 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, signed one day before the sixth
amendment was proposed, guaranteed in the federal courts the right of all parties
to 'plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of... counsel.'
See 1 Stat. 92 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. S 1654 (1970). At the same time James
Madison drafted the sixth amendment, some state constitutions guaranteed an accused
the right to be heard 'by himself and by counsel; others provided that an accused
was to be 'allowed' counsel. In sum .... the colonists and the framers, as well as their
English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel, as an 'assistance' for the
accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself... That conclusion is supported
by centuries of consistent history." Farretta, 422 U.S. at 826-35. See also Bittaker v.
Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that "the purpose of the right is
to protect the defendant's personal autonomy, not to promote the convenience or effi-
ciency of the trial."); United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973).
85. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
86. A criminal defendant who chooses to represent himself unassisted by legal
counsel is referred to as a pro se defendant. Farretta held that a defendant has the
right to defend himself without an attorney being forced upon him over his objection.
The Court in Farretta observed that although the defendant "may conduct his own
defense ultimately to his detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Id. at 834.
87. See supra note 5.
88. See supra note 12.
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judge's duty to supervise the ethics of those attorneys practicing
before him." Additionally, unlike self-representation cases where a con-
victed defendant would have no claim of ineffective counsel," joint
representation cases often involve post-conviction claims. The ineffec-
tiveness of these post-conviction claims as a protection of a defen-
dant's right to counsel combined with the ethical problems involved
justifies at least some measure of interference with a defendant's
choice to proceed with joint counsel."' Joint representation is not the
same thing as self-representation. Each has its own problems and it
does not necessarily follow from the right to represent oneself in
Farretta that there is an absolute right to counsel of choice in joint
representation cases. 92
Just as the right to counsel of choice is not absolute, the power
of the courts to override this right is likewise not absolute. Courts
have clearly recognized that the right to counsel of choice is of con-
stitutional dimension.93 If the mere fact of joint representation is not
enough to trigger any duty on the part of the trial judge to inquire
into the propriety of joint representation," courts surely are not in
a position to hold that joint representation is per se invalid. The fact
that the courts are not willing to accept a per se rule is not all that
makes a per se rule objectionable. It is rather the idea that the right
89. The District Court is charged with the responsibility of supervising the
members of its bar. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961). When a district judge
learns that one of the attorneys in a trial is attempting to serve conflicting interests,
the judge's legal and ethical duty is triggered. These kinds of ethical obligations to
a defendant and to the criminal justice system as a whole are not present in self-
representation cases where no attorneys are involved.
90. A defendant who makes a knowing and intelligent election to represent
himself cannot later make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States
v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d
461 (3d Cir. 1978).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 37-78.
92. Many courts have held that even assuming a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the right to separate counsel, the court in some circumstances has the power to
override a defendant's choice of joint counsel and disqualify such counsel. United States
v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979) (stating
that "the right to retain counsel of choice is not absolute, but must be protected if
possible."); Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (disqualifying joint counsel over valid waivers even
where co-defendants wished to present a unified defense).
93. Flanagan v. U.S., 459 U.S. 1101 (1984) (obtaining reversal for such a right
(to counsel of one's choice) does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense,
since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice, indepen-
dent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding); Curcio, 680 F.2d 881,
884; Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (stating that the right to select a particular attorney is
"the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense."); Armedo-
Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591; Garcia, 517 F.2d 272.
94. See supra, text accompanying notes 60-62.
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to counsel of choice is unimportant enough to be cast aside in every
multiple representation case that is objectionable. It is a basic princi-
ple that when important constitutionally protected rights are at stake,
any state action that implicates such rights must use the least restric-
tive means available to achieve its goal." A flat ban is not the least
restrictive alternative available because in some circumstances there
are valid reasons for a defendant to proceed with joint representa-
tion which outweigh the dangers involved." When such valid reasons
exist, the constitution protects a defendant's right to proceed with
joint counsel."7
B. Reasons to Allow Joint Representation
Despite the seemingly overwhelming dangers, many attorneys
and their clients choose to proceed with joint representation in order
to present a unified defense strategy." This strategy is an especially
95. In the first amendment, state regulations that implicate freedom of
expression rights must use the least restrictive alternative available to achieve its
legitimate goal. See, e.g., Tully v. Calif., 363 U.S. 60 (1960); Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
44 (1938). The "less drastic means" test has also been applied to strike down legisla-
tion designed to achieve highly important governmental ends. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) (court conceded the importance of the governmental purpose-
ascertaining the fitness and competence of public school teachers; but nevertheless
invalidated an Arkansas statute requiring every public school teacher to disclose
annually every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed to within
the previous five-years; court held that a state's purpose, however legitimate and
substantial, "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental liberties."
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Eefgrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11 (1966). In the context of joint representation, the state has a substantial interest
in disqualifying counsel in order to protect a defendant's rights to effective counsel
and in furtherance of the court's duty to oversee the ethical practices of the members
of its bar. To achieve this legitimate end, however, a state should be required to use
means which least restrict a defendant's right to choice of counsel.
96. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
97. Despite the dangers involved, the Supreme Court and many federal circuits
have recognized that an accused knowingly may waive his right to separate counsel
when the right to choice of counsel outweighs the dangers of doing so. See, e.g., Holloway
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482-83 n.5; Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70; United States v. Reese,
699 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1983); Curio, 694 F.2d at 26; United States v. Agosto, 675
F.2d 865, 970 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub. nora., Gustafson v. United States, 103
S. Ct. 77 (1982); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982); Alvarez,
580 F.2d at 1259; Cox, 580 F.2d at 321; United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d 649, 651
(1st Cir. 1978); Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d at 592; Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276-77.
98. See, e.g., Mers, 701 F.2d at 1329 (appellant's interests "are closely aligned
such that their unified front strategy might well have been the best strategy available.");
United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121
(1982); Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (four defendants retained a single law firm to conduct
their unified defense strategy).
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good one in conspiracy cases." It allows multiple criminal defendants
to present to the jury a single story which all of the defendants sup-
port. The overall defense is often much more persuasive to a jury
when alleged co-conspirators are united in their denial of guilt than
when each single defendant testifies solely in his own behalf.'" Another
distinct advantage of a unified defense is the ability to stonewall the
prosecution by frustrating its attempts to single out one defendant
and obtain a plea bargain in exchange for favorable treatment at the
obvious expense of co-defendants. 1
Advantages that accrue from using multiple representation to
present a unified defense are often great enough so that a joint defense
99. At the same time, however, conspiracy cases can cause extra conflict of
interest problems because "the very nature of the charge suggests the desirability
of disassociation." Fryar v. United States, 376 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969). For an excellent example of the potential effectiveness
of the strategy of disassociation by Kenneth Parkinson during the Watergate trial,
see Lowenthal, supra note 35, at 943 n.14. In the Watergate case, Parkinson attempted
to avoid guilt by association (also called the spillover effect) by making sure he was
not seen conferring with the other defendants and their counsel, thus accentuating
his differences from the other Watergate conspirators. The strategy apparently worked
as Parkinson was acquitted while his co-defendants were convicted. See R. BEN VENISTE
AND G. FRAMPTON, STONEWALL 319 (1977). In Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, the Supreme Court noted
the special risks of multiple representation when the charge is conspiracy: "In con-
spiracy cases, where the liberal rules of evidence and the wide latitude accorded to
prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate unfairly against an individual defendant,
it is especially important that he be given the benefit of the undivided assistance
of his counsel." But it should also be noted that the desire to disassociate and be
set apart from other defendants is by definition not present in a unified defense strategy.
The very nature of a unified defense and the desired benefits therefrom are the result
of strength by association, not disassociation. See infra notes 100-05 and accompany-
ing text.
100. See infra note 104; see also Petitioner's Brief at 48-49, Flanagan v. United
States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1984).
101. Many prosecutors seek to disqualify attorneys who represent multiple
criminal defendants because of the effectiveness of this defense strategy, often called
the "stonewall defense." See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982). A stonewall defense strategy allows co-defendants
to band together with one attorney and jointly resist individual efforts by the
prosecution to offer plea bargains in exchange for favorable testimony. Some prosecutors
allege that this strategy is inimical to their legitimate interest in gaining inculpating
information and obtaining pleas from individual defendants, thus improperly impeding
their ability to prove guilt in a particular case. Many prosecutors, therefore, propose
a per se ban on joint representation. See Vaira and Huyett, Time for Rule Certain:
A Proposal to End Representation of Multiple Grand Jury Witnesses, 85 DICK L. REV.
381 (1981) (Author is the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the Flanagan case
was brought; he is a vigorous opponent of multiple representation). The Third Circuit
in United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1978) seems to agree that the
public interest in obtaining valid convictions can outweigh a defendant's interest in
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becomes a defendant's best defense. Multiple representation allows
an attorney to gain the most information possible from all the defen-
dants charged and use it to the best advantage of all the defendants."2
presenting a unified defense:
.. there are public interests which impel an attorney's withdrawal from
representing multiple defendants absent a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Joint representation creates the possibility of defendants 'stone walling'-
obstructing government attempts to obtain cooperation of one of a group
of defendants.
Id.
This result, however, is based on the incorrect premise that a defendant must
present his defense in a way that facilitates the ease with which the prosecution may
obtain a conviction. In our adversary process, each side has the right to present his
best strategy; and that strategy will in most cases presumably be the one that is
most difficult for the other side to overcome. The adversary nature of our system
is bottomed on the belief that it will best serve the public interest in obtaining just
convictions. To hold that a defendant's best defense cannot be presented because it
is more effective in staving off prosecution attempts to single out defendants and expose
individual weakness would, if followed to its logical conclusion, destroy the adversary
nature of our criminal justice system. The result in Dolan is also contrary to the
Holloway court's recognition of the validity of using the advantages that can accrue
from joint representation:
requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent co-defendants, often
referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional
guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. This principle recognizes that
in some cases multiple defendants can appropriately be represented by
one attorney; indeed, in some cases, certain advantages might accrue from
joint representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: 'Joint represen-
tation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common
defense often gives strength against a common attack.'
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Glasser,
315 U.S. at 92.). Further, government motions to disqualify on the ground of conflicts
of interest may in fact be motivated by not totally legitimate objectives. See Margolin
and Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
227 (1982) (Footnotes omitted):
It is the author's opinion, based on familiarity with more than a dozen
cases in which such disqualification 'inquiries' have been filed, that the
government's primary motive in bringing such motions is to disqualify
the most competent lawyers and firms, with little regard for their reputa-
tion for ethical practice. This view is bolstered by the government practice
of making selective disqualification motions against some of the defense
counsel in a given case, and not other, generally less well-known attorneys,
engaged in substantially the same potential conflicts. Simply by inviting
the court to consider whether any potential conflicts are likely to develop,
the government can succeed in putting defense counsel "on trial," using
the courts to compel counsel to disclose, explain and justify financial deal-
ings with past clients, as well as the relation of one client to another,
as a precondition for remaining counsel in a pending case.
Id. at 229.
102. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1294. When a lawyer is
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss3/3
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
In most cases where defendants are separately represented, little in-
formation is shared between co-defendants. Even where separate
attorneys agree to pool their information and cooperate in presenting
a unified defense, the communication will almost never be as fully
open. A defendant will be reluctant to reveal confidential information
to other attorneys who they do not know as well and who have a
primary obligation to another defendant. Moreover, there are other
possible ways for the prosecution to break a unified defense when
all the co-defendants are separately represented. For example, the
prosecutor can more easily tempt an individual lawyer to abandon
the unified defense in order to gain immunity for his client at the
expense of the other defendants. In some cases, this may result in
a conviction of the remaining defendants where a unified defense would
have resulted in acquittal of everyone involved.
Another valid reason why some co-defendants may not wish
separate representation is that they may not want to incriminate a
co-defendant even if it is to their advantage to do so. For instance,
many co-defendants charged in criminal conspiracies are longtime
friends, business associates, or even husband and wife who would
rather face joint conviction than individual exculpation at the expense
of the other.' °3 Such co-defendants may likewise wish to avoid the social
stigma of turning against his colleagues, co-workers, or family
members. The mere fact of separate representation gives the ap-
pearance of differing defenses or levels of culpability. Joint represen-
not forced to rely upon the spotty memory of a single client, details can be cross-
checked with all of them; joint representation may also facilitate interdependent action
by defendants. The receipt of privileged information from co-defendants could very
well cause a conflict if the interest of the two defendants are opposing and the at-
torney is attempting to represent both those interests simultaneously. See supra note
15 and accompanying text. On the other hand, where one attorney presents a unified
defense for two or more co-defendants, he may use any confidential information he
receives to facilitate the presentation of that defense. This information-sharing will
not cause a conflict since it will only be used to strengthen the joint defense. Moreover,
the attorney may avail himself of the "common-defense rule" which holds that waiver
(of the attorney-client privilege) is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence
to a co-party's attorney for a common purpose. See United States v. McPartlin, 595
F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); In Re LTV Securities Litiga-
tion, 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex 1981).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1983) (husband
and wife charged with conspiracy to transport stolen goods; retained a single attorney
to present a common defense; record was "devoid of evidence that would have ex-
culpated one of the defendants but inculpated the other."); Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072
(four police officers in the same squad retained a single firm to present their common
defense.); Curio, 680 F.2d 881 (two brothers waived their rights to be separately
represented and chose a single law firm for their defense.); Laura, 667 F.2d 365 (husband
and wife retained a single attorney and waived rights to separate representation.)
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tation, on the other hand, gives the impression of solidarity and adds
strength by association.'
Finally, co-defendants may have developed trust in a single at-
torney or law firm with whom they have dealt before, and may wish
to be jointly represented by that attorney or firm.'05 This is of no
small importance in light of the fact that the lives and liberty of
criminal defendants are usually at stake. Their desire to place this
life and liberty into the hands of a trusted attorney or firm should
be given great weight before such attorney or firm is disqualified.
C. The Federal Rules Approach [Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 44(c)]
The approach suggested by the drafters of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 44(c) is a step toward correction of the problems
involved in multiple representation. 00 Rule 44(c) provides for an in-
104. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, likewise, noted that advantages can accrue from
joint representation that are not possible when every defendant is separately
represented: "Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimina-
tion. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack." Glasser, 315
U.S. 60, 92 (dissenting opinion.)
105. See, e.g., Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (Appellate court reversed a district
court order disqualifying counsel due to a potential conflict; holding that defendant's
right to choice of counsel outweighed the dangers of conflicts when defendant had
relied on the attorney for more than six years in a substantial number of matters.);
In Flanagan v. U.S., 459 U.S. 1101 (1984) (reversing on other grounds) four co-defendants
were police officers charged with conspiracy and policy brutality. All four defendants
retained the single firm of Sprague and Rubenstone and wished to present a common
defense. One major reason these defendants chose to be jointly represented by this
single firm was due to their belief in the skill and expertise of the law firm's members,
particularly that of Mr. Sprague, Esquire. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Flanagan v. United
States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1984). Mr. Sprague was an attorney with a national reputation
as a prosecutor as well as a defense lawyer. He had formerly served as First Assis-
tant District Attorney for the City of Philadelphia and had an intimate knowledge
of the workings of the Philadelphia Police Department. Id. at 5. Mr. Sprague and the
firm had also previously represented several Philadelphia police officers charged with
criminal defenses, in which instances acquittals had been obtained. Id. at 5. The four
defendants had also gained confidence and trust in the firm during the months prior
to their trial, and this strengthened their desire to continue the joint representation
in order to present a unified defense. Id. at 6. See also Lowenthal, supra note 35,
at 952 n.12. (even with respect to indigent defendants, experienced defender represen-
ting several parties may be preferred to separate but inexperienced counsel.).
106. Rule 44(c) provides that:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant
to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are
represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or
assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall
promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall
personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss3/3
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
quiry by the trial judge into the propriety of joint representation;
by implication this allows some room for a defendant's choice, while
also taking into account the potential conflicts which may arise.' 7 The
Rule's greatest advantage is that it attempts to do what neither tradi-
tional post-conviction review nor a per se rule can: it attempts to
accommodate both competing constitutional rights involved in joint
representation cases."°8
Rule 44(c) is a sound approach, but it is an approach which has
not gained widespread acceptance either in state courts or in the federal
circuits.' 9 A Rule 44(c) inquiry is not constitutionally mandated in all
joint representation cases"' and failure to hold an inquiry is not grounds
for reversal unless the defendant objects to his joint representation
at trial."' Therefore, despite the mandate of Rule 44(c), which requires
of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there
is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court
shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defen-
dant's right to counsel."
77 F.R.D. 507, 593 (1978).
107. The Advisory Committee Notes state that the particular measures to be
taken are appropriately within the court's discretion. Rule 44(c) itself does not ex-
pressly provide for a waiver of the right to separate counsel in order to protect a
defendant's right to counsel of choice. The Notes then state that "one possible course
of action is for the court to obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of
the right to separate representation." 77 F.R.D. 507, 600 (citing DeBerry, 487 F.2d
448). While not taking a position on when a waiver will be allowed, the Advisory Com-
mittee impliedly allows for waivers of the right to separate representation. Presumably
the rationale is to give some weight to a defendant's right to choice of counsel, a
right of constitutional significance. See supra note 93. If a waiver is not allowed, the
other alternative in joint representation cases is to disqualify counsel from represen-
ting multiple defendants. See, e.g., Flanagan, 527 F. Supp. at 903 (disqualifying law
firm from representing four defendants). See also infra note 159. The Advisory Com-
mittee likewise allows for this course of action, but again does not specify under what
circumstances counsel should be disqualified as opposed to obtaining a waiver of the
right to separate representation. See infra note 153.
108. The stated purpose of Rule 44(c) is to "establish a procedure for avoiding
the occurrence of events which might otherwise give rise to a plausible post-conviction
claim that because of joint representation the defendants in a criminal case were
deprived of their sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel." 77
F.R.D. 507, 594 (1978). See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: HEARINGS ON H.R. 7473 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1980).
109. See infra note 114.
110. See supra note 60.
111. The Cuyler court stated that the duty to inquire comes into effect only
under "special circumstances." Such special circumstances occur when the trial judge
knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. See supra note 61.
In practice, a trial judge's decision to not hold a Rule 44(c) hearing is given a great
deal of deference. One manifestation of the deference given to trial judges who fail
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that a hearing be held "whenever two or more defendants . . .are
represented by he same retained or assigned counsel. . ..,. courts are
left free to decide for themselves when to conduct such a hearing. The
Cuyler decision states only that the constitution requires an inquiry
by the trial judge under "special circumstances;" the mere fact of joint
representation is not a special circumstance."'
Although designed to protect constitutional rights, Rule 44(c)
lacks a constitutional mandate and thus has led to the widespread
practice among the circuits of generally not holding such hearings."'
Many federal circuits and most states continue to employ traditional
post-conviction review as the sole safeguard of a defendant's sixth
to hold Rule 44(c) hearings is that many appellate courts strictly enforce the Cuyler
requirement that a judge must have notice of a particular type of conflict being alleg-
ed as the basis for relief. See supra note 61. For example, in Wilson v. Morris, Slip
Opinion No. 82-2252 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 1984) one attorney represented two co-defendants
charged with rape and armed robbery. The attorney objected to a joint preliminary
hearing, stating that he believed there was a potential conflict that could arise. The
court overruled the motion for separate preliminary hearings, but ordered separate
trials for the two co-defendants. After being convicted, petitioner (one of the co-
defendants) sought a writ of habeas corpus from the district court on the ground that
the state court held the joint preliminary hearing over defendant's objection, thus
requiring automatic reversal under Holloway. The Seventh Circuit held that since the
defendant's attorney objected only to the joint hearing and not to the joint represen-
tation itself, the Holloway rule was inapplicable. For the same reason the court also
held that no duty to inquire into the propriety of the joint representation was trig-
gered. An objection to a joint hearing is thus not a "special circumstance" which puts
a court on notice of potential conflicts due to joint representation.
112. See supra note 106.
113. See supra note 61.
114. See, e.g., Wilson v. Morris, Slip Opinion No. 81-2252 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 1984)
(holding that it is up to the defense attorney to object to joint representation; without
such an objection the court does not have notice of any real conflicts and therefore
no duty to inquire into possible conflicts.); Tonaldi, 716 F.2d at 439 (inquiry held, but
dicta noted that such inquiry need not be held in every case.); Lyons, 703 F.2d 815
(stating that the inquiry and advice provided for by the rule are not ends in themselves
but are merely procedures designed to prevent conflicts of interest.); Mers, 701 F.2d
at 1326 (held that where a single attorney represented four defendants in a criminal
trial that the district court erred in failing to conduct an adequate hearing into the
propriety of joint representation, but the error was harmless.); Alvarez, 678 F.2d at
1309-10; U.S. v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982)
["if non-compliance (with Rule 44(c) is mentioned for the first time on appeal, we think
it not plain error and decline to reverse the case or inquire further into the matter
" .. 1; Parker, 662 F.2d at 484 (no hearing held; court followed Cuyler noting that
"nothing in our precedents suggests that the sixth amendment requires state courts
to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case.") Note,
however, that some trial judges do hold Rule 44(c) hearings on a regular basis, but
no appellate courts hold they are duty-bound to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Gullett,
713 F.2d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 1983); Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072.
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amendment rights."' The attitude of these courts is that the inquiries
of Rule 44(c) are not ends in themselves, but merely rules of pro-
cedures designed to prevent conflicts of interest. " ' It is certainly true
that Rule 44(c) is designed to prevent conflicts, but it is also true
that Rule 44(c) is necessary to protect the two fundamental constitu-
tional rights of effective assistance of counsel and choice of counsel.
The Rule protects these two rights by insuring that a defendant's
choice of joint counsel is voluntary and made with full knowledge of
the risks he is taking by choosing to be jointly represented. "7
The attitude of courts that fail to hold Rule 44(c) inquiries stems
from the Cuyler holding that unless objection to joint representation
is made at trial, the judge can assume that no unacceptable conflict
exists."8 This conclusion, however, is based on the questionable
assumption that an attorney can always fully and fairly advise his
clients about the dangers of and alternatives to joint representation. " 9
This conclusion also directly contradicts many statements contained
in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 44(c), which the Supreme
Court itself approved. 2' The Notes clearly state that any procedure
less than that enunicated in Rule 44(c) would not adequately protect
a defendant's sixth amendment rights. 21 The Notes also urge that
"when there has been 'no discussion as to possible conflicts initiated
by the court,' it cannot be assumed that the choice of counsel by the
defendants 'was intelligently made with knowledge of any possible
conflict.''ln From these statements it appears that the Advisory Com-
mittee would support a constitutional mandate of Rule 44(c) as a
necessary protection of a defendant's sixth amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel. Yet, the Notes conclude by stating that
115. See supra note 114.
116. See Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, citing, Benavidez, 664 F.2d at 1258-59.
117. The Advisory Committee states "that defendants should be jointly
represented only if 'the court has ascertained that .. .each understands clearly the
possibility of a conflict of interest and waives any rights in connection with it."' 77
F.R.D. 507, 600, quoting, DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 47. ("absent special circumstances, trial courts may
assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and
his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.")
119. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
120. See supra note 60.
121. 77 F.R.D. 507, 600 (1978). The Notes go on to state that "it would not
suffice, for example, to require the court to act only when a conflict of interest is
then apparent, for it is not possible to 'anticipate with complete accuracy the course
that a criminal trial may take."' Id. at 600, quoting, Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d
1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969).
122. 77 F.R.D. at 597, quoting, Carrigan, 543 F.2d at 1057.
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"the failure in a particular case to conduct a Rule 44(c) inquiry would
not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal of a conviction of a jointly
represented defendant." 2 ' Thus, the Committee retreats from its
original position that an inquiry is necessary to adequately protect
a defendant's sixth amendment rights. For if an inquiry of some kind
is necessary to protect constitutional rights, failure to conduct that
inquiry would constitutionally mandate automatic reversal.2 '
A constitutional mandate of some form of inquiry in every joint
representation case can be based on the recognition of the necessity
of an inquiry to the protection of a defendant's sixth amendment
rights. 2' The current practice of inferring a waiver of the right to
separate counsel from lack of objection at trial may be in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."' The due
process clause guarantees that certain fundamental rights will not be
taken away by the state without due process of law."7 Among these
fundamental rights covered by due process protections is the "liberty"
right of an accused to a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own
choice." '8 The numerous cases involving the sixth amendment right
to counsel have unanimously held that the right to counsel includes
the right to effective counsel unburdened by conflicts of interest."
123. 77 F.R.D. at 603, citing, Carrigan, 543 F.2d at 1057; DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 125-46.
125. Rule 44(c) as it stands lacks concrete guidelines regarding what specific
procedures would be constitutionally required were the rule itself to be constitutionally
mandated. Rule 44(c) also fails to specify when joint representation should be allowed
to continue as opposed to disqualifying counsel. See infra text accompanying notes
147-56. These guidelines could be developed through case law, or as in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the court could specify what procedures are required
and under what circumstances joint representation may be continued.
126. Although the contemporaneous objection rule has been held valid, see
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), the inference of a knowing and intelligent
waiver in this context, where such an important right exists, arguably should be
excepted. See generally Vandercoy, Waiver of Claims By Inadvertant Procedural Defaults:
Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments in Indiana, 18 Val. U. L. Rev. 231 (1983).
127. The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the taking
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CO NST. amend. XIV, S
1. The first step in deciding whether a certain alleged right is protected under this
clause is to determine whether the alleged right is a life, liberty, or property interest.
128. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). Crooker held that state refusal
of a request to engage counsel violates due process not only if the accused is deprived
of counsel at trial on the merits, but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part
of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect
his subsequent trial with an absence of "that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice." Id. at 439 (citations omitted). See also Powell, 287 U.S. at
53 (due process requires a fair opportunity to secure counsel.); Chandler v. Fretag,
348 U.S. 3 (1954).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 45-65.
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Therefore, due process should also guarantee a fair opportunity to
secure effective counsel.
Inferring a waiver of the right to separate counsel from lack of
objection at trial arguably violates this right to a fair opportunity
to secure effective counsel. To have a fair opportunity to secure
effective counsel, a defendant must be in a position to appreciate the
consequences of a decision to proceed with joint representation.
Without some procedural safeguard, most defendants will be unable
to make an informed decision. As previously noted, it is almost im-
possible even for the attorney to predict before trial what types of
conflicts may arise and how they may hinder his performance.",
Moreover, any advice regarding the dangers of joint representation
that the attorney does give to a multiple client is by definition not
disinterested.13 ' Therefore, without a pretrial inquiry of some kind,
most defendants will not be in a position to object to their joint
representation due to their inability to appreciate the dangers that
lie ahead. In addition, post-conviction remedies are inadequate since
the trial record may mask many conflicts. 32 Thus, the risk of
erroneously depriving a defendant of the right to a fair opportunity
to secure effective counsel is so great that a minimal inquiry by the
trial court is warranted in joint representation cases. 8'
A procedural safeguard is necessary because in each and every
multiple representation case, a defendant has the constitutional right
to choose between two alternatives: (1) to proceed with joint represen-
tation in the face of potential conflicts or (2) to demand he be separate-
ly represented. The current approach, which assumes a waiver of the
second choice when not expressly invoked, works a manifest injustice.
130. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
133. An analogy can be made to civil cases where the risk of erroneously depriv-
ing a person of an important life, liberty, or property interest is an important factor
in determining whether there is due process violation. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. In joint
representation cases, there is a great danger that without a mandatory procedural
safeguard, criminal defendants will erroneously be deprived of their right to a fair
opportunity to secure effective counsel. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
Therefore, under an Eldridge analysis, due process requires more than mere inaction
on the part of the trial judge.
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It is constitutional error to assume that a defendant appreciates the
dangers of joint representation and chooses the first alternative when
nothing is even mentioned at trial about such dangers. Due process
should demand that valid procedures be held to insure that a choice
of such importance as this is knowingly made by the defendant and
not imposed on him by the state.""
The language of the two recent Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with joint representation also suggests that the court may be will-
ing to constitutionally require a Rule 44(c)-type procedure sometime
in the future."5 For this to happen, the Court will have to realize
the implications of its statements in Cuyler that a "possible conflict
inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation." ' It is
probably more accurate to say that in every joint representation case
some conflict of interest will probably occur sometime during the
proceedings."'7 In either event, the Cuyler court also held that the
duty to inquire comes into effect when the trial judge "knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.""'3 The court
in Holloway noted that the major significance of an objection at trial
is that it gives the judge the notice needed to trigger his duty to
inquire.'
Given the dangers that are present in almost every joint
representation case and the difficulty a judge has in gaining notice
of potential conflicts, it is a small step to hold that reasonable notice
of a potential conflict inheres in the very fact of joint representation
itself. If the Supreme Court takes this step and constitutionally man-
dates some form of inquiry, a defendant will be less likely to forfeit
his sixth amendment rights because either his attorney or the judge
failed to spot a conflict. As Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence
in Cuyler, "the court cannot delay until a defendant or an attorney
raises a problem, for the Constitution also protects defendants whose
attorneys fail to consider, or choose to ignore, potential conflict
problems.""5 By recognizing that the mere fact of joint representa-
tion is likely to cause a conflict and that inaction by the trial judge
unduly endangers a defendant's rights to counsel, the Supreme Court
can mandate Rule 44(c) and be consistent with its precedents.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
135. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
136. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 10-36.
138. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347.
139. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484.
140. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 351.
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Finally, the Supreme Court can find precedent for a constitu-
tionally mandated inquiry in its decision in Miranda v. Arizona."'
Miranda held that a criminal defendant must be advised of his con-
stitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel present before
he is questioned."" The rationale behind this decision is in many
respects similar to the rationale for constitutionally requiring a Rule
44(c) inquiry. The Miranda Court found that without these warnings,
a criminal defendant would in many instances be deprived of his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination by unwittingly foregoing
this right.1 4 ' The failure to give a Miranda warning is thus a per se
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of
whether an actual violation of the privilege occurs. 4 The Court in
effect held that the prophylactic measures specified in Miranda are
necessary to the protection of a fundamental constitutional right."'
The right to counsel in criminal cases is equally fundamental. By
recognizing the inadequacies of the traditional approach, it becomes
clear that as in Miranda a procedural safeguard is also necessary to
the protection of a defendant's right to counsel in joint representa-
tion cases.
The sixth amendment right to effective counsel is equally fun-
damental, but the argument to mandate a procedural safeguard is
perhaps even more compelling in joint representation cases than in
Miranda. A jointly represented defendant is more likely to unwittingly
141. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
142. Id. at 444. The Supreme Court held that unless other fully effective means
are devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and to assure a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required: "prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage in
the process that he wishes to consult with attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning." Id. at 444-45.
143. In Miranda, the court concluded that "without proper safequards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." Id. at 467.
144. The Miranda court held that the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defen-
dant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
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forego his right to separate counsel due to the difficulty of appreciating
the dangers of potential future conflicts.' 6 An average criminal defen-
dant is surely much more aware of the consequences of his self-
incriminating testimony than a jointly represented defendant is of the
possible consequences of his joint representation. If attorneys and
judges have difficulty spotting and appreciating the dangers of possi-
ble future conflicts due to joint representation, surely a criminal defen-
dant is in need of at least minimal procedural safeguards designed
to protect his sixth amendment right to adequate assistance of counsel.
III. SUGGESTED PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO A CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED RULE OF INQUIRY
A. Current Problems with Rule 44(c)
A constitutional mandate of Rule 44(c) would be a step in the
right direction towards solving the problems of multiple representa-
tion. However, the Rule as it is currently stated lacks sufficient
guidelines as to what procedures would be regarded by a trial judge
as constitutionally necessary to protect a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel.' Courts which hold Rule 44(c) proceedings are
split over four primary issues: (1) whether a defendant may waive
all future "actual" conflicts or whether he can waive only certain
specified "potential" conflicts, (2) under what circumstances a waiver
will be deemed knowing and intelligent in joint representation cases,
(3) whether the court may refuse to accept certain knowing and in-
telligent waivers and disqualify joint counsel over defendant's objec-
tions in certain instances, and (4) what standard of review to apply
when co-defendants choose to proceed with joint counsel and are later
convicted.
In its present form, Rule 44(c) does not specify whether a defen-
dant may waive only certain potential conflicts that are discussed at
the inquiry, or whether a defendant's waiver may include every actual
or potential future conflict. Theoretically, a waiver of all future con-
flicts would totally preclude post-conviction attacks based on conflicts
due to joint representation alone.' Many courts that hold Rule 44(c)
146. Thus, it may be that the procedural safeguard in joint representation cases
should entail more than just a warning. A mere warning by the trial judge may not
be sufficient to protect a defendant's right to counsel due to the difficulty of fully
appreciating the dangers involved. See infra text accompanying notes 122-26. However,
a mere warning by the judge will certainly come closer to protecting this right than
the current practice.
147. See infra notes 152-53.
148. See infra note 150.
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inquiries allow a defendant to waive actual conflicts" 9 so long as the
waiver is knowing and intelligent, thus completely insulating a con-
viction from later attack.1' Other courts, recognizing the extreme dif-
ficulty of determining before trial what conflicts might arise and what
effect they might have on their attorney's effectiveness, allow only
a waiver of certain potential future conflicts."' Waiver would thus
be limited in these courts to the types of conflicts actually discussed
at the proceeding and post-conviction relief would only be allowed
as to those conflicts not discussed and waived at the proceeding. 52
Likewise, Rule 44(c) does not specify under what circumstances
a waiver will be accepted as opposed to requiring disqualification of
joint counsel.' 1 Most trial courts will accept a waiver of the right
to separate representation if no actual conflict currently exists.'"
However, a few appellate courts now hold that even without an actual
conflict, the trial judge may disqualify joint counsel over a defendant's
otherwise valid waiver if he finds that a conflict is "likely to occur
sometime in the proceedings.... While it is necessary to disqualify
joint counsel in many instances, a disqualification order has a
dangerous impact on a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
of choice.'"
149. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 719 F.2d at 913 (holding that "once the right to separate
counsel is waived, even an actual conflict is waived thereby, and a defendant has totally
waived his sixth amendment right to conflict-free counsel."); Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (trial
court disqualified co-defendants' joint counsel due to actual conflict; court held defen-
dants must be given an adequate opportunity to waive their right to conflict-free
counsel.); Laura, 667 F.2d at 372 (district judge identified an actual conflict; court
accepted this finding but held it to be irrelevant since the appellant waived the conflict.)
150. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 719 F.2d at 912 ("if a waiver is obtained, the defen-
dant cannot at a later date attack his conviction based on an assertion of conflict.);
Tonaldi, 716 F.2d 431; Flanagan, 679 F.2d at 1076 ("a truly knowing and intelligent
waiver accepted by the court will insulate a conviction from later attack.")
151. See Levy, 557 F.2d at 210-11 (Stun, J., dissenting); Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038.
152. Rule 44(c) fails to provide adequate guidelines for review of a post-conviction
claim of ineffective counsel due to a conflict of interest. The Advisory Committee Notes
merely indicate that "although a trial court's failure to make a Rule 44(c) inquiry will
not necessarily result in reversal, an appellate court is more likely to find that a conflict
existed in this instance. 77 F.R.D. at 603.
153. According to the Notes to Rule 44(c), this is a matter appropriately left
to the discretion of the trial judge. The Notes only state that "the court need not
permit the joint representation to continue merely because the defendants express
a willingness to so proceed." 77 F.R.D. at 601.
154. See, e.g., Curcio, 694 F.2d 14; Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 431; Tonaldi, 716 F.2d
431; Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203; Mers, 701 F.2d 1321; Laura, 667 F.2d 365.
155. See, e.g., Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 82-97.
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The impact of a disqualification order is especially threatening
to a defendant's right to choose his own counsel in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Flanagan v. United States.'57
Flanagan held that an order disqualifying counsel does not fall within
the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, and is
therefore not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.158 Prior
to this decision, six federal circuits in addition to the third circuit
had allowed immediate appeal of pretrial disqualifications of criminal
defense counsel.'59 Immediate appeals previously offered some measure
of protection for a defendant's choice of counsel. After Flanagan,
however, a defendant must wait until after a full trial to assert his
constitutional claim.1" With such impediments to review of a dis-
qualification order, it becomes even more important to develop a con-
stitutional standard to guide trial judges. Whether the judge decides
to disqualify counsel or accept a waiver, he is making a decision that
impacts on a defendant's two competing sixth amendment rights.
B. A Suggested Approach
From the foregoing it is clear that some form of action, either
legislative or judicial, is in order.' The best approach is to require
157. 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984).
158. Id. at 1052. The Court stated that to come within the "collateral order"
exception to the final judgment rule, a trial court order must "1) conclusively deter-
mine the disputed question, 2) resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action, and 3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment." Id. at 1055, citing, Coopers and Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)
(emphasis added). Justice O'Connor noted that post-conviction review of disqualification
orders is fully effective to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one's choice
is like, for example, the sixth amendment right to representing oneself, since obtaining
reversal for violation of such a right does not require a showing of prejudice to the
defense. See McKaskle v. Wiggans, 104 S. Ct. 944, 951 n.8 (1984). Further, the policy
behind the final judgment rule against piecemeal review of trial court decisions that
do not terminate the litigation is especially strong in criminal cases, where a defen-
dant has the sixth amendment guarantee to a speedy trial. While a disqualification
order is not "effectively unreviewable after entry of a final judgment," it is clearly
more difficult, costly and time consuming. Since a defendant's right to counsel of choice
is a right of constitutional dimension, it is even more important that specific guidelines
be set at the disqualification stage in order to protect such an important right.
159. See United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 1983); Curcio,
694 F.2d 14, 19-20; Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 968 n.1; Gustafson, 459 U.S. 834; Hobson, 672
F.2d 825, 826; Smith, 653 F.2d 126 (entertaining appeal without discussion of appealability
question.); Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 275. The ninth circuit has held that such orders are
not immediately appealable. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1110-13 (1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
160. See supra note 158.
161. With the exception of Miranda, supra note 141, the Supreme Court has
generally been reluctant to impose constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards
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a mandatory Rule 44(c) proceeding in each and every joint represen-
tation case. If some form of Rule 44(c) inquiry is mandated, the trial
judge will only be left with a choice between accepting a waiver or
disqualifying joint counsel.'5 ' In many cases, the mere initiation of any
inquiry should cause co-defendants to consider the consequences of
being jointly represented. This will insure that the choice of separate
representation is one of their own volition. In other cases, co-
defendants will decide it is to their advantage to proceed with joint
counsel. In these cases, a trial judge must delicately weigh a defen-
dant's constitutional right to choice of counsel"' against the often over-
riding concerns inherent in joint representation.'"
In order to consistently achieve the proper balance between these
two competing concerns, it is necessary that a standard be articulated
from which a trial judge may make a decision which least restricts
the constitutional right impacted by that decision. The suggested stan-
dard is one which disallows any waiver of the right to separate
representation unless the co-defendants desire to proceed with joint
representation in order to present a unified defense and such a defense
is plausible. This suggested per se rule with a unified defense excep-
tion is based on the premise that the only valid reason for a defen-
dant to risk the dangers of joint representation is in order to pursue
such a strategy.'65
in other areas of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 567 (1978) (legislation, not the fourth amendment is the proper means to protect
newspapers from illegal searches); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (procedures for identification of suspects is more effectively developed
by legislative action than by judicial fiat.) A legislative rule would achieve the same
result as a constitutionally mandated procedure. But where the legislature fails to
act and fundamental constitutional guarantees hang in the balance, the Supreme Court
must act to protect them.
162. See supra note 108.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 82-97.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 10-78.
165. Following the rationale of the Farretta decision, it might appear to be
unconstitutional to condition allowing joint representation on a showing of the
plausibility of a certain defense strategy. Farretta, which held that a criminal defen-
dant has the right to represent himself unassisted by counsel, was based on the fun-
damental right of a defendant to choose how to conduct his case even if he chooses
to conduct it eventually to his detriment. See supra note 86. Farretta stated that the
defendants' choice is to be honored out of respect for them as free and rational be-
ings, responsible for their own fates. It is the defendants, not the judge or prosecutor,
who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. Farretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
Joint representation, on the other hand, does have personal consequences for the lawyers
and judges involved. Defendants choice of joint representation creates dangers not
involved in self-representation cases, primarily because of the problems of conflicting
ethical duties that can effect a lawyer's advocacy in joint representation cases. See
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The per se aspect of the suggested standard is warranted for
the same reasons which suggest that a Rule 44(c) procedure should
be constitutionally required.'" Joint representation involve dangers
which will in most cases outweigh a defendant's right to choice of
counsel. These dangers involve the defendant's competing constitu-
tional right to effective assistance of counsel,"'7 the improbability of
obtaining a fully knowing waiver of this right due to the impossibility
of predicting conflicts before trial,"68 the difficulty of post-conviction
review, e9 and the court's duties to supervise the ethics of the at-
torney's practicing before it.7 ' These concerns are especially dangerous
in joint representation cases because the trial record may mask so
much, and because a conflict of interest puts restraints on a defense
attorney in a manner distinct from other forms of ineffectiveness. They
can only be outweighed by a defendant's right to choice of counsel
when co-defendants choose to present a unified defense, and such a
defense is plausible.' Only in this situation are these overwhelming
concerns sufficiently minimized to be outweighed by a defendant's
right to choice of counsel.
A joint defense strategy sufficiently minimizes these concerns
for a number of reasons. First, the danger of violating a defendant's
competing sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is
minimized because the reason that a joint defense strategy is pur-
sued is to present a more effective defense.' Second, most actual con-
supra text accompanying notes 10-36. Only when a unified defense strategy is presented
can a single attorney adequately represent the interests of more than one defendant
at the same time. Thus, this exception is warranted to protect the defendants' rights
to counsel of choice. Only in this situation is this choice not outweighed by the dangers
involved in choosing joint representation. See infra text accompanying notes 172-77.
166. The per se aspect is necessary because in joint representation cases that
do not present a unified defense strategy, a criminal defendant will probably unwit-
tingly forego his right to separate counsel and his attorney will probably be in breach
of his ethical duties owed.to each individual defendant. See supra text accompanying
notes 125-46.
167. See supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 37-78.
170. See supra note 89.
171. As stated by the Second Circuit in Carigan, 543 F.2d 1053: "the right
to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount in
the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take precedence
over all other considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants
concerned and their attorney." See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION at 213, concluding that in some circumstances "even full disclosure and con-
sent of the client may not be adequate protection."
172. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
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flicts that would harm co-defendants pursuing differing defense
strategies are by definition not present when co-defendants pursue
a unified defense strategy. In this strategy, each co-defendant will
not testify to any evidence which tends to harm any of his
co-defendants."' If the strategy is carried through, no single defen-
dant will want, for example, to negotiate a plea or have his degree
of culpability compared with that of his co-defendants throughout the
trial.7 Most of the potential conflicts of joint representation are
therefore resolved by the co-defendants' faith in the inevitable results
of the joint strategy.175 Third, the ethical rules expressly allow an at-
173. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
174. See infra note 175.
175. See, e.g., Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, where four co-defendants chose to retain
a single law firm to conduct their joint defense. The district court judge, pursuant
to a Rule 44(c) proceeding, discussed with each defendant eight areas of possible con-
flict that tend to arise in joint representation cases:
1) Opening and Closing Statements-Unlike separate counsel, joint counsel would not
be able to set one defendant apart from another.
2) Sentencing-In the event that more than one defendant were convicted, joint counsel
could not argue that one defendant was more or less culpable than another.
3) Spillovers -Possibility that jury might infer from joint representation that if one
defendant is found guilty, the others must be also.
4) Possible Grants of Immunity-Each defendant was told that the government could
offer one of the defendants immunity on the condition that he testify against the others,
thus interferring with a joint trial strategy.
5) Nature of Evidence-It was explained to each defendant that the government might
introduce more evidence tending to implicate defendant Flanagan (the alleged "leader"
of the conspiracy), and that as a result:
a) the jury might infer that the others were guilty because of joint representation; and,
b) defense efforts might be more concentrated toward the defense of Flanagan.
6) Right to Testify-If one defendant exercised his right to testify on his own behalf
and one or more of the others did not, the jury, from the fact of joint representation
alone, might infer guilt on the part of those not testifying. Also, on cross-examination,
the defendant who exercised his right to testify could be questioned as to his knowledge
of activities involving the other defendants.
7) Character and Reputation Testimony-Each was informed that if the defense offered
character or reputation testimony on behalf of some but not all defendants, the jury
might infer from the fact of joint representation that the character or reputation of
the other defendants is undesirable.
8) Right to Separate Counsel-Each was apprised of his right to separate counsel,
and that, if he could not afford counsel, the court would appoint counsel for him.
Flanagan, 527 F. Supp. at 903.
The above possibilities for conflict are likely to be present in every joint represen-
tation case where a common defense will not be presented. Where no common defense
is presented, defendants will want, for example, to be set apart for the purpose of
showing different levels of culpability at opening and closing statements or sentenc-
ing, for favorable treatment pursuant to a plea bargain, or for showing differences
in character or reputation. On the other hand, where a common defense will be
presented, it would not be to their advantage to be so compared. Any danger that
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torney to jointly represent co-defendants if he believes he can ade-
quately represent their best interests. 6 Moreover, since most of the
potential conflicts normally associated with joint representation are
resolved by a joint strategy, a single attorney will not be in breach
of his duty to represent the best interests of his clients. Indeed, if
a common defense is the best defense under the circumstances, an
attorney arguably has a duty to present that defense.77
Pursuant to these principles, the trial judge should have the duty
to hold an inquiry proceeding similar to Rule 44(c) whenever an at-
torney attempts to represent multiple clients in a criminal trial. This
duty should be constitutionally mandated and made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
At the Rule 44(c) inquiry, the judge will be required to disqualify
counsel from further representing more than one defendant unless
counsel alleges that he wishes to proceed with joint representation
in order to present a unified defense strategy.'78 If after consultation,
the jury may infer guilt of all defendants from the fact of joint representation are
tactical risks taken in the belief that the jury may well infer innocence of all the
defendants. Thus, any spillover effect is used in a joint defense strategy for its advan-
tages, and any risks that the jury may infer certain facts to a certain defendant's
disadvantage is the result of the trial strategy. Brief for Petitioner at 47-79, Flanagan
v. Untied States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1984). The District Court nonetheless disqualified the
single firm from further representing any of the defendants, apparently because of
the belief that the joint strategy would not be plausible under the factual circumstances
of the case. Flanagan, 527 F. Supp. at 903. A joint defense may not have been plausi-
ble in this case due to the varying degrees of culpability between the four co-defendants.
Many circuits have found actual conflicts where co-defendants are forced to take a
unified defense despite the fact of varying degrees of culpability. See, e.g., Austin v.
Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973) (actual conflict found where a woman accused
with her husband of killing her child was represented by the same attorney as her
husband, and evidence revealed that the husband alone had perpetrated the acts
resulting in the child's death); Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975)
(multiple representation found constitutionally infirm where unified defenses were taken,
yet the evidence suggested the crime was committed by only one person.)
176. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION, S 3.5 commentary at 214 (1971); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103-31; Developments
in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1380-81
(1981).
177. Many commentators and perhaps more significantly, the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the national Legal Aid and Defense Association
find joint representation ethical and even necessary, in some cases. See Margolin and
Colliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
227, 253 (1982); See also Brief for the NACDL and the NLADA as Amici Curiae in
support of Petitioners at 16-17, Flanagan v. United States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1984).
178. As is currently the approach in some courts, separate counsel would be
appointed for every indigent defendant. See, e.g., Ford, 379 F.2d 123 (requiring initial
appointment of separate counsel for each indigent defendant pursuant to the court's
supervisory powers.); Gaines, 529 F.2d at 1044 n.4; Fryar, 404 F.2d 1071; Morgan, 396
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counsel decides that the defendants would benefit from joint represen-
tation, he would be required to notify the court within the deadline
for filing motions at which time a Rule 44(c) inquiry would be
instigated to determine if a joint strategy is plausible.179
At the Rule 44(c) inquiry, it must be determined that a unified
defense is plausible." Since the attorney is in the best position to
determine which is the best defense under the circumstances, the
judge or a magistrate should in most cases defer to the attorney's
judgment unless it is clear that a joint defense is not plausible.' A
deferential approach will also have the benefit of adequately protecting
privileged information that has been acquired by the attorney. A
magistrate can inquire only so far into confidential areas and the
defense strategy without committing error. 82 While it may be
necessary to require that the attorney-client privilege be waived to
the extent necessary to persuade the magistrate that a unified defense
is plausible, by deferring to an attorney's judgment, a waiver of this
important privilege can be kept to a minimum.
If co-defendants wish to proceed with joint representation, the
magistrate must obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to separate counsel." This will insure that each defendant's choice
is voluntarily made and will also prevent many post-conviction claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.'" It must be emphasized that a
F.2d 110. See also McFarland v. Indiana, 359 N.E.2d 267, 268-69 (Ind. App. 1977) where
the Indiana State Court urged public defender offices to adopt the Ford rule; however,
Indiana still requires proof of a conflict for reversal.
179. Once the court has been notified, a Rule 44(c) proceeding should be
scheduled at a reasonable time period before trial to determine the propriety of the
joint representation. The purpose of this time period is to allow sufficient time for
the prosecution to engage in plea bargaining with individual defendants should the
court order separate representation. This will also allow time for new attorneys to
become familiar with the case and to formulate an individualized defense strategy.
180. This decision should ultimately be made by a federal magistrate or an
impartial judge at this special proceeding. The proceeding should also be held ex parte
as a prophylactic device to ensure that the defendant's fifth amendment self-
incrimination rights are protected.
181. See supra note 175 for an example of a case where the judge found that
a unified defense strategy was clearly not plausible.
182. See, e.g., Tonaldi, 716 F.2d at 438 (courts are not free to inquire deeply
into the attorney-client relation, nor are they free to elicit in advance the substance
of a defendant's testimony.)
183. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
184. The standard for finding a valid waiver of constitutional rights was first
established by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst and was later refined in Brady v. U.S.,
397 U.S. 742 (1970). Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. Brady held that "waivers of constitu-
tional rights not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent acts done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady,
397 U.S. at 748.
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pre-trail waiver of separate representation is only being accepted by
the court in order to protect a defendant's right to choose joint
representation where the dangers of joint representation are being
held to a minimum. 5 Were the unified defense to break down, the
waiver of the right to separate representation would immediately
become inoperative. If a defendant decides to switch his position,
counsel must be disqualified from representing the adverse defendant
due to an actual conflict caused by divergent defense postures and
counsel's resultant inability to effectively represent all the defendants.
The procedures suggested in this note will undoubtedly place
added burdens on the trial judge. Yet other burdens will at the same
time be lessened. A mandated per se rule with the limited unified
defense exception will preclude habeas review of claims of ineffective
counsel due to joint representation that now clog reviewing courts.
The suggested rule is formulated to protect the individual choice of
an accused to the extent possible given the dangers of multiple
representation to a defendant's right to secure effective counsel. When
constitutional rights clash, a balance must be struck between them.
Sometimes the striking of that balance requires a court to affirmatively
act to prevent one side of the balance from unjustly canceling out
the other. In joint representation cases, both sides of the balance are
of constitutional dimension. A constitutionally required procedure
similar to the one suggested will insure that the balance between the
two competing rights involved weighs evenly at all times.
Conclusion
In view of the dangerous legal and ethical problems associated
with joint representation of criminal defendants, the trial judge should
be required to do more than merely assume counsel has adequately
dealt with these problems by discussing the dangers with his clients.
185. For the purposes of deciding whether a defendant may attack his convic-
tion on habeas review, a waiver of the right to retain separate counsel in this context
is not a waiver of the right to effective counsel. It is rather a choice to proceed with
joint representation; a choice which will only be allowed when the dangers of joint
representation have been minimized by the unified defense. The suggested prophylatic
rules will place added burdens on the trial court at the pretrial stage. However, the
rule will have the advantage of precluding later habeas review of allegations of
ineffective counsel due to joint representation. Habeas review will be precluded since
an express waiver is required to proceed with joint representation, thus constituting
a "deliberate bypass" of the right to retain separate counsel. See Henry, 379 U.S. at
443 (rights deliberately bypassed are unreviewable on direct or habeas review.) A
convicted defendant will still be able to pursue a habeas corpus attack on the basis
of ineffective or incompetent counsel that allegedly arose due to something other than
the mere fact of joint representation.
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The sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective counsel and
the right to choice of counsel; however, these rights clash in the joint
representation context. Therefore, the sixth amendment itself man-
dates a procedure whereby both rights are protected to the greatest
extent possible. The suggested procedure, which requires the court
to inquire into the reasons for co-defendants choosing to be jointly
represented, and allows such representation only where a common
defense appears plausible, will ideally strike a fair balance between
these two competing constitutional rights.
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